Source: Pobjeda
“Compared to the period of the referendum, the political situation in today’s Montenegro is in some aspects the same, and in others different. Society is once again divided—along both old and new imported lines, and the situation is full of tension. However, it seems that today there are not enough serious leaders willing to calm these tensions and work toward solving problems through dialogue and agreement. It is as if responsibility for the spoken words and made decisions has disappeared from politics,” says František Lipka, president of the Republic Referendum Commission during Montenegro’s 2006 state status referendum, in an interview with Pobjeda.
The former ambassador of Slovakia to Montenegro, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the former Yugoslavia—an esteemed Slovak diplomat and expert on the region, whose messages are closely followed in the Western Balkans—emphasizes that it is not realistic for Montenegro to complete negotiations with the European Union by 2026.
POBJEDA: You were the president of the Referendum Commission accepted by both blocs. You held the golden vote that was crucial in rejecting more than 200 complaints from the bloc advocating for the state union. And yet, in the end, you organized a dinner for the members of the Electoral Commission, and everyone attended. How did you manage to achieve that?
LIPKA: I did not have any ‘golden vote’; that term was coined by a senior official of the SNP at the time, probably to suggest to the public that the outcome of the referendum was decided by someone else, not by the people of Montenegro. There were two dinners—one at my invitation at the ‘Pod Pločom’ restaurant when the referendum results were announced, and another farewell dinner at the ’13. Jul’ restaurant at Mareza, when the work of the Referendum Commission concluded. All members of the Commission attended these dinners, and I can tell you that the atmosphere was pleasant and friendly. It was clear that everyone felt relieved that the referendum ended peacefully, without the conflicts that accompanied the creation of independent states in other former Yugoslav republics. The shortest and most accurate answer to your question, ‘How did you manage that?’ would be: At that time, politics was conducted by gentlemen.
But I will try to give you my perspective on those events. The Commission was established on a parity basis, and we worked diligently for three months, every day. All members freely and equally expressed their opinions and defended their positions on every issue during our discussions. Of course, there were many heated moments, but everything remained within the bounds of professional legal and political debate. What mattered most was that all decisions of the Commission up until election day were made by consensus of the members from both blocs. I did not vote even once. The OSCE also noted in its report that ‘the Commission operated in an open and transparent manner throughout the entire process’ and that ‘all decisions were taken with consensus.’
The members of the Commission had countless opportunities to see that I was fair and neutral, that I did not favor either bloc. They also saw that I was capable of taking a firm stand in defending the Commission’s independence and the fairness of the referendum process. When one member of the Commission from the pro-union bloc was arrested—allegedly for ‘unauthorized submission of a voter registration application’—I threatened to resign from the Commission if that person was not immediately released. I was serious about that, because I could not lead a Commission that was not balanced. It seems I earned the trust of all Commission members, who had no reason to decline my invitation to dinner.
POBJEDA: We are marking 19 years of independence—nearly two decades. It seems that today we are facing even greater challenges than in that historic year of 2006. How much has Montenegro changed? Surely, we could have done more and better?
LIPKA: I don’t like the cliché “we surely could have done more and better.” Every society achieves only what is possible within the existing political, international, and historical circumstances, and what is allowed by the civilization level of the society in the broadest sense of the word. I believe Montenegro has made good use of its years of independence and has achieved a number of notable results that have positively changed the country’s image, character, and its position on the international stage.
To mention just a few of the most important achievements: Montenegro succeeded in building a civic, multiethnic society—unfortunately, these civilizational values have come under challenge in recent years; it attracted major foreign investments and, thanks to them, strengthened the country’s economic potential and improved citizens’ living standard; it developed an infrastructure network—including the construction of a section of the highway; it became a NATO member and is the leading candidate for accession to the European Union. These are all commendable accomplishments. Unfortunately, the country has not managed to overcome the divisions in society dating back to the time of the referendum, nor some newly imported ones.
POBJEDA: You were an active participant in the referendum process, which was organized according to the highest European standards. In your opinion, what was crucial for the democratic nature of the referendum and its outcome? It seems as though that very democracy has disappeared in today’s Montenegro?
LIPKA: Every political process, its nature and its outcome depend on the people leading it. Montenegro was fortunate that the referendum process was led by serious individuals who wanted to resolve this sensitive issue of Montenegro’s future in a democratic way—through a referendum. With the help of the European Union, they managed to agree on the rules of the referendum, the so-called lex specialis, and to follow those rules to the end. These were people who, above all, felt a deep historical and personal responsibility for ensuring a peaceful outcome. And that applies to the leaders of both blocs—the bloc for Montenegrin independence and the bloc for a state union with Serbia. Of course, society was deeply divided over the future constitutional and legal status of Montenegro. The atmosphere was tense and full of pressure, but the leaders of both sides made an effort to keep those tensions within the bounds of the political process and within the framework of political campaigns befitting the importance of such a historic referendum question.
Compared to the period of the referendum, the political situation in today’s Montenegro is in some aspects the same, and in others different. Society is once again divided—along both old and new imported lines, and the situation is full of tension. However, it seems that today there are not enough serious leaders willing to calm these tensions and work toward solving problems through dialogue and agreement. It is as if responsibility for the spoken words and made decisions has disappeared from politics.
POBJEDA: The government is convinced that we can complete negotiations with the EU by the end of 2026, and Brussels appears willing to welcome us. Are you optimistic that this can happen?
LIPKA: I don’t think that is realistic, for several reasons. The outcome of accession negotiations with the European Union—whether positive or negative—will have a long-term impact on Montenegro’s future development, and that is why your question deserves a broader answer. By the time of the parliamentary elections in August 2020, Montenegro had opened all negotiation chapters—31 in total—and closed three, placing it at the forefront of candidate countries on the path to EU membership. This success was achieved at a time when the European Union—sometimes with reason, sometimes without—was slowing down the enlargement process. After August 2020, the European integration process in Montenegro stagnated: both the Krivokapić government and the Abazović government completely ignored the European agenda.
It was only after the 2023 elections that Spajić’s government placed the European agenda among its strategic priorities and achieved certain results: it fulfilled the conditions for obtaining the IBAR and closed three negotiation chapters. It was also aided by the EU’s new approach to enlargement—under pressure from geopolitical turmoil, the EU decided to accelerate the enlargement process and to stabilize the Western Balkans by integrating candidate countries. However, this new approach does not mean that the Union will stop insisting on fulfilling all technical and political conditions required to close the negotiation chapters.
In order for Montenegro to achieve its ambitious goal of closing the remaining 25 open chapters by the end of 2026, it would need to close, for example, 11 chapters by the end of this year and 14 more next year. However, the government has closed only three chapters in the two-year period from June 2023 to May 2024. Therefore, the current pace of implementing the European agenda clearly indicates that closing 25 chapters within the next two years is highly questionable—in other words, it will not be possible.
For neither technical nor political reasons: the government lacks sufficient expert capacity and does not have a realistic, coordinated program for implementing the tasks from the European agenda. Moreover, it seems that part of the parliamentary majority does not genuinely wish for Montenegro to become a member of the EU. Such political perception is not shaped by pro-European statements—of which there are plenty—but by political actions that distance Montenegro from the European Union. This includes reopening identity issues that divide society and push the European integration process into the background. Such actions send the EU a message that Montenegro, in terms of European values, is still not mentally prepared for membership.
Sometimes it seems that the Government and Parliament are playing a strange political tango with the EU: one step forward towards the EU, two steps backward. For example, they first take a step forward by fulfilling the minimum requirements to obtain the IBAR, and the very next day, they take two steps back—the parliamentary majority adopts a Resolution on Jasenovac, knowing full well that this endangers the closure of negotiation chapters, not only at the Intergovernmental Conference in December 2024. Or, at the Intergovernmental Conference, Montenegro closes only three chapters out of four, due to Croatia’s veto caused precisely by the Resolution on Jasenovac. However, even this wasn’t a strong enough warning—just the next day, the Parliament takes two steps back by controversially retiring Constitutional Court judge Dragana Đuranović, thus endangering the independence and functioning of the Court. And the unblocking of the Constitutional Court was one of the most important conditions for obtaining the IBAR!
It seems that the parliamentary majority still hasn’t realized that any member state can block Montenegro’s accession to the EU, and that in countries like France and Austria, Montenegro’s entry into the Union will be decided by a referendum! If Montenegro truly wants to join the EU, it will have to keep its promises, fulfill its commitments, respect EU legislation, and be careful not to damage its relations with the European Commission and member states through certain decisions.
The question is how the implementation of the agreement with Mr. Alabbar will affect Montenegro’s European path—the President of the EU Council, Mr. Costa, was very clear on this matter, stating, and I quote: “These agreements must fully comply with EU laws, especially in the areas of public procurement and environmental protection.” We do not yet know what France’s final reaction will be to the sudden change in the tender conditions for the airport concession—just 30 days before the decision was to be made.
However, a shift in the EU’s current favorable stance on enlargement—and toward Montenegro—cannot be ruled out. Within the European Union, internal conflict between liberal-democratic and illiberal nationalist-right-wing member states is expected to intensify, and this will inevitably lead to changes in several common policies, including the enlargement policy.
It could happen that the liberal-democratic member states take the position that Montenegro’s accession to the EU, with a government that does not fully share all EU values, would pose a risk to the unity and effectiveness of the European Union: it would expand the bloc of illiberal member states and strengthen their chances of blocking decision-making and obstructing reforms aimed at deepening internal integration and strengthening the EU as a global strategic player. And that is precisely why liberal-democratic member states, wishing to avoid this danger, will justifiably insist that Spajić’s government strictly meet all the technical and political conditions. This will be an extremely difficult task for it to accomplish by the end of 2026, or even by the end of its mandate in 2027. I would be happy to be wrong.
POBJEDA: Slovakia has been and remains a great friend of Montenegro. You worked hard to help Montenegro join NATO and move closer to the EU. How do you see the future cooperation between Slovakia and Montenegro? What do you think is the greatest potential of this country and its society?
LIPKA: You are right, Slovakia has always supported Montenegro’s European ambitions, not only politically in NATO and EU institutions, but also through concrete projects. For four years, we ran the project National Convention on European Integration of Montenegro in your country. The goal of this project was to familiarize your citizens with the process of European integration and involve all layers of society in it, because it’s not just the government that enters the Union, but the entire society—civil society, the opposition, universities and scientific institutions, professional organizations, local governments, trade unions… And it is precisely this crucial segment that I feel is missing at this stage of your accession process.
And for four years, we ran the project Montenegro on the Way to Euro-Atlantic Family. The goal of this project was to provide your citizens with an objective understanding of the Alliance and its irreplaceable role in maintaining security, stability, and peace in the Euro-Atlantic area. We also aimed to provide your citizens with enough relevant information to better understand the benefits of NATO membership.
Our friendship is built on solid foundations of historical experience, shared views on many key issues, and successful cooperation in the recent past. For this reason, I am convinced that Slovakia will continue to support Montenegro on its path to the EU and in the processes of democratic reforms.
The greatest potential of any country and society is always its people. The younger generations who will take over the country and continue to develop it in the context of rapid technological progress and often unpredictable changes in the European and global political scene, but also in the context of Montenegrin tradition.
* František Lipka (1946) is a Slovak linguist, translator and diplomat. Since the end of the 1980s, he has been active in diplomacy. He served as an ambassador of Czechoslovakia to the former Yugoslavia and of Slovakia to France, UNESCO, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Montenegro. In 2006 Lipka became the Referendum Commission President (Chairman of the Electoral Commission) for the upcoming Montenegrin Independence Referendum and was in charge of supervision over the course of the referendum, its results and a safeguard of the adherence to correct and valid election processes.
