Source: Pobjeda
POBJEDA: The security situation in Montenegro has never been worse. There is general disarray, ignorance, and lack of professional integrity in the security sector, resulting in street chaos, frequent murders due to criminal clan clashes, and beatings of municipal leaders. There is no accountability, as security officials exchange accusations amid constant threats. Is this the gravest consequence of populism (the kind you pointed out in interviews), which has engulfed Montenegro in all spheres—from economic and political to security?
VUKOVIĆ: At the core of populism is the avoidance of all kinds of responsibility, specifically shifting the blame onto “the others”, who are portrayed as an existential threat to the order promised by populist leaders. Consequently, populism and irresponsibility exist in a chronic symbiosis, and the success of populism is directly dependent on how effectively populist decision-makers avoid political, social, legal, and any other form of responsibility. The irresponsibility we are talking about simultaneously manifests as a destructive force that ignores—or, if possible, dismantles—the entire legal framework on which the system rests, because for populists, the system is only necessary to the extent that it sustains their legitimization of irresponsibility.
So, when the situation arises where rules, procedures, and ultimately court decisions “block” populist irresponsibility, that system is automatically portrayed as the “legacy of the others” who want to undermine the effectiveness of populist intentions. Consequently, one kind of litmus test for every populist movement is their obsession with the judicial branch, which is often singled out as the first political target to be dealt with.
For populists, all power must be subordinated to politics, and for them, the systemic division of power, political cohabitation, or any opposition to their political goals are perceived as threats rather than challenges. What is important to keep in mind is that populism is not an end in itself, but primarily a means through which authoritarianism is introduced in a devious way. The fact that populists tend to improvise is not the most problematic aspect; rather, it is their tendency to act outside the system or introduce a series of extraordinary or temporary measures, all justified by the promise of quick results. Quick fixes, bypassing laws, passing liberal and unconstitutional laws, relying on interim appointments and similar methods are the behavioral pattern of all populists. What unites all these moves is the promise that security of the “people” will be ensured. Consequently, alongside attacks on the judiciary, populists are obsessed with controlling the security sector, which allows them to label all previously mentioned threats primarily as security threats that must be fought with extraordinary measures.
All of this has already been seen in El Salvador, Hungary, Venezuela, and a number of other examples where, under the guise of electoral will, populist leaders dismantled any semblance of democratic systems and, under the pretext of defending “the people”, introduced a series of measures that endangered the fundamental human rights and freedoms of their citizens. This is exactly what is happening in Montenegro—the system being built is not liberal in essence, it is repressive in form, authoritarian in intent, but above all, chronically irresponsible. The forces in power are mostly socialized in the spirit of renewing the Milošević-era style of governance, while simultaneously inspired by the apparent success of Vučić’s model in today’s Serbia.
POBJEDA: The attendance of former Democratic Front members (Andrija Mandić and his party colleagues) at the reception marking U.S. Independence Day, along with the welcoming smile of the U.S. ambassador, has been interpreted by many as a thaw in relations between official Washington and this political group. However, it should be emphasized that diplomatic protocol prescribes inviting the highest-ranking officials of the host country to such receptions. So, is this merely a courteous invitation, or is there some truth to these speculations?
VUKOVIĆ: First and foremost, diplomatic protocol is clear, and this invitation can primarily be viewed in that light. At the same time, it should always be kept in mind that the current administration in Washington no longer prioritizes the promotion of a values-based foreign policy. Instead, greater emphasis is placed on transactional and stabilocratic relations. This is something that Trump based his campaign on, and now the contours of that foreign policy are becoming visible. It is already clear that the U.S. avoids any conditioning methods aimed at promoting liberal democracy policies, and instead focuses solely on stabilizing bilateral relations to the extent possible and transactional and opportunistic.
Since American diplomacy no longer relies on USAID and similar programs to project its interests and expectations, it is clear that the U.S., at least in the short term, will abandon what has defined American foreign policy in previous decades. It is telling that the invitation was preceded by an “open letter” published by Mandić in the influential magazine The National Interest, in which he wrote exactly what the Washington administration wants to hear: the focus is placed on bilateral relations through a call for economic cooperation, accompanied by a reflection on very abstractly described historical ties; in other words, there is a complete disregard for allied relations through NATO, the ignoring of foreign policy based on the values of liberal democracy, and the use of the controversial and often criticized agreement with the UAE as a model for further economic relations with the U.S., along with a remark about alleged different civilizational circles compared to the UAE.
A clear message has been sent that the leadership of the former Democratic Front is ready to cooperate based on these principles, which has quite possibly been received with understanding at the State Department. It remains to be seen whether this understanding will develop into something more than mere protocol courtesy.
POBJEDA: Officials from Brussels often speculate about dates for the conclusion of the negotiations, but it is clear to everyone that Montenegro cannot join the EU with this government. Do you believe the stories about a government reshuffle (the entry of DPS instead of the former Democratic Front) with the help of European partners? And why do we always wait for some mediator?
VUKOVIĆ: It is ungrateful to speculate about any government reshuffles. Such topics are primarily used as trial balloons to test public opinion, and based on that, new policies are formulated. It is obvious that Brussels wants to see Montenegro in the EU more than the majority of decision-makers in Montenegro do.
If you observe the patterns of behavior over the past few months—from controversial legislative solutions to equally contentious economic measures—it is clear that the populists in power are in no hurry to consolidate democracy, the rule of law, a market economy, or the protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms. It is also clear that the key opponents of these processes come precisely from the ranks of the former Democratic Front and Democratic Montenegro, as the ministries they control and the proposals they put forward in parliament are the driving force behind such regressive policies. At the same time, PES (The Europe Now Movement) is skillfully taking advantage of this, hiding behind other coalition partners to feign autonomy (which does not exist) in front of European officials, while signaling that it is open to cooperation with all—though in reality, they are far closer to the DF and the Democrats than to anyone in the opposition.
Not long ago, Democratic Montenegro took a similar approach, often being perceived in the West as ready and capable of forming a coalition with the DPS—something that ultimately materialized in the overthrow of Dritan Abazović’s government. PES is now doing something similar. But just as the Democrats ultimately failed to prove themselves a reliable partner to the West at that time—resulting in significant time lost on the path to EU membership—the same can be expected from PES, which is following the same pattern of stalling and buying time.
POBJEDA: Montenegro’s Statehood Day passed amid protests, roadblocks, and the awarding of honors to individuals who deny the very existence of this state—and it seems we have never been more divided. The government and the Serbian Orthodox Church are also carrying out a highly dangerous project of historical revisionism, shaking the very foundations of Montenegro. Where is the way out—if one exists at all?
VUKOVIĆ: There is nothing unexpected about the dedicated efforts of populist leaders and their affiliated societal actors to write a new, retouched version of history. In El Salvador, Bukele has built his entire narrative around denying the purposefulness of the 1992 peace agreement, which, according to him, only enabled the enormous enrichment of the rotating elites who signed it. In Hungary, Orbán fuels his populism through the re-victimization of the Hungarian “people”, who, in his words, suffered a historical injustice through the Treaty of Trianon—an injustice he claims he is ready to correct.
In Poland, the PiS government insisted on revising the history of World War II, promoting an interpretation of the Holocaust as something for which Polish society bears no responsibility. Therefore, this revisionism should be directly linked to the need to legitimize the emerging authoritarian system through populist demagoguery, new historical “facts”, and alternative interpretations of historical developments. It is a system in which the supposed victim is granted the opportunity to achieve “justice”—a form of justice that overrides all existing values, rules, and procedures. This kind of “justice” is, in fact, revolutionary justice: repressive, exclusive, and ultimately prone to totalitarian view of reality and the “either us or them” perspective.
Populists, therefore, welcome resistance—but only the kind that is sporadic, lethargic, and systemic; in other words, the kind they can easily respond to while portraying themselves as new victims merely defending against a wave of rebels who reject their policies. The way out of this cycle is a long one. On the one hand, accountability must be constant, explicit, and unequivocal. Any pragmatic compromise only serves to further empower populism and authoritarianism.
On the other hand, resistance must be creative, appealing, and sufficiently comprehensive in order to force populists back into their core, hardline base. And that base, while always loud, is ultimately numerically marginal. A visible problem in Montenegro is that PES is not consistently treated as a populist movement, but rather as a potential partner for those who wish to see the country freed from the very populist policies mentioned earlier. It must always be remembered that it is PES that has allowed, legitimized, and promoted all of these policies; that after election promises of a “third way”, it has repeatedly ended up in the embrace of the DF; and that it is always the first to trivialize key issues whenever someone points them out. At the same time, the greatest paradox is that all of their political “successes” thus far have been a continuation of DPS-era policies—especially in foreign affairs—while everything original they have introduced has led to democratic backsliding and economic unsustainability.
POBJEDA: It has been more than a month since the U.S. attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. How risky was that move, and has it made the situation in the Middle East even more complicated?
That move was a carefully calculated measure designed to allow Israel to pull back from further escalation while still leaving room for further negotiations with Iran. The strike was remote-controlled, pre-announced, and carried out with minimal destructive effect. At the same time, it allowed both the Israeli and Iranian governments to consolidate their influence domestically, thereby enabling them to negotiate with the U.S. under a broader cloak of legitimacy. What remains a challenge for Trump is the fact that any negotiations will ultimately result in Iran being allowed to retain its nuclear program—and therefore, will be identical to the JCPOA negotiated by Obama.
It remains to be seen what new narratives will be used to justify such an outcome, given that a large number of Republicans invested their political capital in criticizing Obama and the JCPOA, expecting Trump to completely eliminate Iran’s nuclear program. All signs suggest that Trump is now prepared to compromise—and that includes allowing Iran to retain its nuclear program. What remains uncertain is the extent to which uranium enrichment will be permitted.
POBJEDA: How do you view Trump’s policy so far? Do you get the impression that American institutions and the system are showing resilience, that his positions—particularly on the war in Ukraine—are being adjusted, and that his stance toward Putin is significantly different than at the start of his term?
VUKOVIĆ: I wouldn’t call it resilience of any kind, but rather a realization that the entire policy of pragmatic patience is failing to deliver results. The promise to resolve the conflict within 24 hours has proven counterproductive. Trump has often emphasized that he respects and admires Putin, which makes it clear that he sees this whole process primarily as a contest between strong men. What he dislikes is the fact that Russia doesn’t stick to any commitments and isn’t impressed by what he offers. The Russians have recognized that their negotiating strategy—demanding only maximalist outcomes—has paid off, and they are now waiting to see how far Trump is willing to bluff with his threats.
In the meantime, Ukraine has managed to craft a new narrative that resonates with Trump—namely, that supplying weapons is actually a profitable business for the United States. We now see that Trump has been quite willing to allow the delivery of American weapons —paid for by someone else, namely Europe and Canada— thereby presenting himself to Russians as someone who isn’t bluffing. I tend to think this hasn’t greatly unsettled the Kremlin, and that this move is unlikely to significantly alter their plans to turn the war in Ukraine into an attrition warfare in the trenches, where victory goes to whoever can endure the longest on the battlefield. And the Kremlin is managing to influence the narrative to the extent that it frames the current war in terms of economic losses—specifically, the unrealized economic potential of U.S.–Russia trade—which is something highly relevant to the Trump administration. In the end, everything comes down to narrative control: who can best present Trump with the reasons that will convince him he’s on the right side of history.
POBJEDA: The Balkans are no longer a focus of the U.S. administration, and the consequences of that are evident in every country in the region. As U.S. support and assistance weaken, others—like Russia—are stepping in to take the lead. Does this mean that the region is destined to permanently remain the EU’s antechamber?
VUKOVIĆ: I would reframe the question by saying that it’s not about others “taking over” the region, but rather about the consolidation of an already established primacy. Despite being preoccupied with developments in Ukraine and affected by international isolation, Russia continues to skillfully use its established sharp power infrastructure in the Western Balkans. It is now especially important to emphasize that it is up to local decision-makers to demonstrate that they are ready to resist this influence—it is not enough to simply expect that in response to messages from Brussels or other European capitals.
It is extremely important to hold all populist leaders in the Balkans accountable—those who say one thing in Brussels and another in their own countries. We must insist that they clarify their positions, demand precise answers, and emphasize that politics cannot be conducted through party statements and Twitter posts. So, to return to the beginning of the interview, it all comes down to introducing a practice of accountability in politics for everything said, done, and promised. Russia skillfully manipulates the narrative precisely because they know none of their allies or supporters will be called to any responsibility.
* Dr. Siniša Vuković is Senior Lecturer of Conflict Management and Global Policy, and the Director of the Master of Arts in Global Policy Program (MAGP) at Johns Hopkins University. Previously, he was the Associate Director of the Conflict Management Program (2018-2021). His research focuses on various forms of international conflict resolution, negotiation and mediation. He has published in a range of scholarly journals such as Journal of Peace Research, Cooperation and Conflict, Global Policy, The Washington Quarterly, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Swiss Political Science Review, Millennium Journal of International Studies, International Journal of Conflict Management, International Negotiation, Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies, and Ethnopolitics, policy-relevant outlets such as Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, European Council on Foreign Relations, World Economic Forum, Sustainable Security, and Policy Forum, and contributed to several edited volumes with book chapters. He is the author of International Multiparty Mediation and Conflict Management (Routledge, 2017), and Rethinking Conflict Management and Resolution (with I. William Zartman; Edward Elgar, 2023), and the co-editor of Revisiting the “Ripeness” Debate (with Tetsuro Iji; Routledge, 2022). His current book projects include: The International Negotiation Process (with P. Terrence Hopmann), and Handbook on the Politics of International Agreements (with P. Terrence Hopmann; Edward Elgar). He has taught a variety of undergraduate and graduate courses related to the field of conflict management, with a particular focus on the process of negotiation and mediation. He is also a visiting professor at the Institute of Security and Global Affairs, Leiden University, and at the Amsterdam University College, University of Amsterdam. He received his PhD in International Relations and Conflict Resolution at Leiden University, an MA in International Relations and Diplomacy from Leiden University and The Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, and a BA (laurea) in Political Science from University of Rome La Sapienza. He is the recipient of many research grants, including “Rubicon” from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO), and Gerda Henkel Foundation research grant.
