New WBN Analysis – Hybrid Pressure and Internal Capture: Montenegro’s Hidden Security Crisis

Introduction

As of 2025, on the surface Montenegro appears to be on a broadly positive trajectory. Against the backdrop of persistent geopolitical uncertainty in the Western Balkans, Podgorica has registered tangible progress in its European Union accession negotiations. After years of slow movement, in 2024–2025 the government successfully provisionally closed multiple negotiating chapters of the EU acquis. Following the closure of one chapter (Public Procurement) in June 2025, Montenegro provisionally closed five further chapters by December 2025, bringing the total to twelve completed chapters out of 33 opened in the accession process, a significant milestone in the country’s bid to join the EU.¹

The current Montenegrin government also enjoys a stable parliamentary majority, and its reform record has been regularly praised by key EU and NATO partners, who publicly affirm that Montenegro is aligned with European standards and “on the right track” toward eventual accession. Observers within the EU institutions and allied capitals have underscored Montenegro’s relative advancement compared to other Western Balkan aspirants, even as they caution that the most challenging reforms lie ahead.²

Economically, Montenegro has exhibited moderate but steady growth in recent years. According to national and international estimates, the Montenegrin economy expanded by approximately 3.2% in 2024, with similar growth forecasts for 2025 in the range of 3.0–3.2%, driven largely by private consumption, investment, and resilient tourism performance.³ These figures suggest a degree of macroeconomic stability and resilience amid broader regional and global headwinds.

Yet, beneath this seemingly positive exterior, Montenegro faces profound and structural challenges that could undermine both its democratic trajectory and its long-term stability. Politically, the most powerful factions within the ruling coalition remain markedly pro-Serbian and, by extension, sympathetic to Russian geopolitical narratives, raising concerns among Western interlocutors about the durability of Montenegro’s alignment with Euro-Atlantic norms. Institutionally, the judiciary has been repeatedly accused by domestic critics and international monitors of being used selectively to target political opponents, eroding public confidence in the rule of law.

Security institutions, especially within law enforcement and intelligence, lack the consolidated professionalism expected of an EU and NATO partner, creating vulnerabilities to foreign infiltration and influence operations. Economically, despite respectable headline growth, structural imbalances persist, including an oversized public sector workforce and a labour market that struggles to generate sufficient private-sector employment. Social cohesion and national identity are under strain as well: efforts by segments of Serbian nationalism to undermine Montenegrin statehood and cultural distinctiveness have intensified, with the Serbian Orthodox Church frequently positioned at the forefront of these cultural and symbolic campaigns.

Taken together, these undercurrents reveal a Montenegro that, while formally advancing toward European integration and enjoying commendations from Western allies, remains deeply contested internally and vulnerable externally.

In the sections that follow, this analysis will unpack these interconnected political, security, economic, and cultural dynamics in detail, laying a foundation for clear strategic insights and actionable policy recommendations for Montenegro’s leaders and their partners in NATO and the EU.

Political Situation

As we stated in the introduction, Montenegro is often portrayed in Western capitals as a “success story” – a small Balkan democracy making steady progress toward EU integration and maintaining its place in NATO. However, this narrative masks deep systemic dysfunction. Montenegro remains far from secure in its democratic trajectory, and the progress achieved so far – fragile and contingent – can be easily derailed or even reversed.

At the core of this vulnerability is the current dependency of the government, public institutions, and parliamentary majority on hard-line Serbian nationalist forces that have disproportionately shaped political life since the 2020 elections. The former coalition known as the Democratic Front (DF) and the increasingly authoritarian Democrats party, led by Aleksa Bečić, continue to exert outsized influence. These parties maintain close collaboration with Aleksandar Vučić’s regime in Serbia and ideological alignment with Vladimir Putin’s Russia, pursuing a dual strategy: either turning Montenegro into a “Trojan horse” for Russian and Chinese geopolitical interests within NATO and the EU, or, if that proves unachievable, sabotaging Montenegro’s EU path altogether. For Belgrade’s leadership, a Montenegro inside the EU while Serbia stays outside represents a strategic loss; thus, their preferred outcome may well be preventing Montenegro’s accession rather than facilitating it.

This bloc advances its objectives through multiple levers of state power. One of the most concerning is the weaponization of law enforcement and the judiciary, especially the Office of the Special Prosecutor for Organized Crime and Corruption. Rather than acting as a neutral institution committed to rule of law, the police apparatus – tightly controlled by the Democrats – and the Special Prosecutor have been used selectively against political opponents. Opposition figures have faced intense prosecutorial attention for relatively minor alleged corruption cases (often involving amounts below €5,000), which result in sensational arrests but later collapse in court for lack of evidence. At the same time, allegations of much larger corruption and organized crime ties among governing parties and closely associated institutions, including pro-Serbian politicians and the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC), rarely receive serious investigation.

This imbalance extends beyond formal politics and into the media environment. Independent and opposition-aligned media outlets and journalists operate under a climate of pressure, intimidation, and stigmatization. Journalists covering corruption, organized crime, and political patronage face public denunciation by political figures and threats by officials, contributing to a chilling environment for investigative reporting. For example, media groups and journalists have been publicly targeted and maligned by political leaders, fuelling narratives that depict critical reporting as criminal or corrupt, and reinforcing polarization in public discourse.⁴

At the cultural and societal level, the Serbian Orthodox Church remains one of the most powerful forces in Montenegro’s public life. Its authority is not confined to the spiritual sphere; it is a decisive factor in government formation and in shaping policy on culture, education, and relations with neighboring countries such as Serbia, Croatia, and Kosovo. The Church’s leadership consistently promotes narratives that undermine Montenegrin statehood and identity, advocates for political and ecclesiastical unification with Serbia, and maintains strong ties with Russia. Clergy have been observed publicly expressing support for Russian geopolitical aims, including in the context of the war in Ukraine, reflecting an alignment that reinforces authoritarian tendencies and weakens democratic cohesion.

The corrosive influence of the SOC is compounded by the weakening of Montenegro’s civil society sector. Civil society once played a vital corrective role under the long rule of the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) (2006–2020), pushing for transparency and accountability. Since the political turnover, however, much of the sector has either receded from frontline engagement or become less willing to confront abuses by the new governing majority. This abdication of civic oversight diminishes a crucial bulwark against authoritarian backsliding and reduces societal resilience to corruption and power capture.

Taken together, these trends paint a picture of a political landscape where institutions are captured or influenced by partisan and external agendas, media and civil society are constrained, and identity politics – amplified by religious authority – drive extremely harmful narratives. This dynamic not only jeopardizes democratic norms but also risks derailing Montenegro’s EU integration process at a time when progress remains provisional.

In the next section, we turn to how these deep political currents intersect with issues of culture and identity, exploring how narratives of nationhood, language, and history are being mobilized in ways that reinforce political destabilization and influence Montenegro’s strategic orientation.

Attacks on Montenegrin Identity and Attempts at Cultural Assimilation

Since the political shift in 2020, pro-Serbian and pro-Russian forces, backed by the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) and entrenched within positions of power, have significantly intensified efforts not merely to influence Montenegrin politics but to undermine the very identity of the Montenegrin people. What is at stake is not only ideological contestation but a strategic campaign that dovetails with hybrid warfare tactics employed by Moscow and Belgrade to fracture Montenegrin society, weaken civic cohesion, and complicate the country’s Euro-Atlantic trajectory.

At the heart of this campaign is the systematic negation of Montenegrin identity and culture, a narrative that seeks to present Montenegrins not as a distinct nation with their own language, history, and cultural traditions, but as Serbs. This narrative strategy mirrors wider Russian and Serbian nationalist frameworks that deny separate linguistic and cultural identities – much like the denial of Ukrainian linguistic distinctiveness in Russian discourse – and uses state and religious institutions as vectors of influence.

One of the first major moves in this long-term strategy was a concerted effort to replace Montenegrin patriots in educational and cultural institutions with hard-line Serbian nationalists. A defining example was the tenure of Vesna Bratić as Minister of Education, Science, Culture and Sports, during which a large number of school principals were dismissed in 2021. A significant proportion of these dismissals were later ruled unlawful by Montenegrin courts, with schools winning compensation for wrongful termination, indicating that the legal basis for the mass firings was weak or politically motivated. Former directors were compensated with substantial amounts after proving their removal had been illegal, underscoring the breadth and illegitimacy of the dismissals.⁵

This pattern extended beyond basic education into other sectors of public life, from cultural centers and art associations to humanistic and historical institutes and academic bodies. Pro-Montenegrin institutions, such as the Faculty of Montenegrin Language and Literature, have faced repeated defunding threats and deliberate academic marginalization. This aligns with a broader nationalist talking point promoted by pro-Serbian actors that Montenegrins “do not have their own language” and should instead speak Serbian, an argument that tacitly echoes narratives used by Russian authorities to deny the legitimacy of Ukrainian language and culture.

In the cultural and symbolic arena, the attacks have been especially brazen. Marko Kovačević, Mayor of Nikšić and a prominent Democratic Front politician, was widely reported to have given the middle finger during the playing of the Montenegrin national anthem at a municipal ceremony, a gesture captured on video and widely circulated in Montenegrin media, yet sparking little effective legal or institutional consequence.⁶

Similarly, local officials such as the Mayor of Pljevlja have regularly backed and organized events steeped in radical Serbian nationalist symbolism, such as “Saint Sava Gatherings”, which often serve as platforms for aggressive narratives that run counter to Montenegrin statehood and cultural autonomy.

The cultural debate reached a flashpoint with the 2025 award of the prestigious “13 July Award” – Montenegro’s highest state honor – to Bećir Vuković, an author known for denying the existence of the Montenegrin nation and expressing support for Chetnik ideology, a controversial strand of Serbian nationalist thought associated with collaborationist forces in World War II. The decision sparked street protests and clashes with police in Podgorica, with civil society figures and artists decrying the choice as an affront to national values and identity.⁷ The choice of Vuković proved to be especially controversial when he was allegedly caught on camera stealing groceries from a supermarket, yet even this didn’t compel the Serbian nationalist leaders in cultural institutions to rescind the award.

These symbolic battles over language, history, and culture are not peripheral; they are integral to a broader strategic offensive aimed at eroding Montenegrin social cohesion and delegitimizing the Montenegrin national narrative. By attacking the institutions that sustain a distinct Montenegrin identity, from schools to universities to cultural awards, pro-Serbian and pro-Russian forces seek to make Montenegrin society more receptive to narratives that align with Belgrade’s and Moscow’s geopolitical interests.

Just as Russia’s hybrid warfare in Ukraine combines military pressure with disinformation and cultural subversion, these cultural and identity assaults are part of a larger strategy to destabilize Montenegro from within. Paired with informational campaigns and political leverage, these attacks weaken the bonds that bind Montenegrin society and make the country more vulnerable to external influence and internal fragmentation.

In the next section, we will examine how these cultural and identity pressures intersect with Montenegro’s broader security situation, exploring how hybrid threats, institutional capture, and external meddling challenge the country’s stability and resilience.

Security Situation

Although Montenegro is today a peaceful NATO ally, the security landscape is far from secure. The risk of deterioration is real, not only from traditional external threats, but especially from a combination of external destabilization and internal political fractures that weaken the state’s ability to respond. Should hostile actors in Serbia and Russia exploit internal vulnerabilities – including pro-Serbian political forces and influence networks within Montenegrin institutions – the consequences could be profound.

At the heart of Montenegro’s security vulnerability is the weakness of its security system. While NATO membership provides a formal security guarantee, the resilience of Montenegro’s own defense and intelligence apparatus remains limited. This is partly because influence networks linked to Serbian nationalist parties have reportedly penetrated key institutions, including police, military, and intelligence services, creating openings for external interference and internal sabotage.

A second, more structural problem is Montenegro’s decision-making framework for national security. Montenegro’s military and overall security posture are guided by the Security and Defence Council, composed of the President, Prime Minister, and the Speaker of Parliament. Crucially, Andrija Mandić, leader of the Democratic Front (DF) and currently Speaker of Parliament, holds one of these seats. Mandić is openly allied with pro-Serbian and pro-Russian political currents and has been a central figure in Montenegro’s political struggles; past allegations linked him to the 2016 coup attempt aimed at halting Montenegro’s NATO accession, an event that was documented and investigated by Montenegrin authorities and Western intelligence as involving Serbian and Russian actors seeking to disrupt Montenegro’s Euro-Atlantic trajectory.⁸

Even though the legal process regarding these events continues and a retrial has been ordered by Montenegrin courts, the intelligence and Western diplomatic community have repeatedly affirmed the substantive threat that plotters with external backing posed to national security.

Under current law, every major decision within the Security and Defence Council requires unanimity. This gives Mandić, a politician with strong nationalist and anti-Montenegrin leanings, the power to block critical decisions such as military deployments, activation of national defense measures, or even requests for consultation under Article 4 and Article 5 of the NATO Treaty – mechanisms designed to address security threats and collective defense. In practice, this means Montenegro’s security shield within NATO can be neutralized from within, should political leverage be used to obstruct consensus.

The internal security situation is already showing strains. Radical pro-Serbian and pro-Russian political elements have leveraged social disputes into broader security flashpoints, such as the Botun protests. In late 2025 and early 2026, residents of the village of Botun and Zeta municipality, supported by elements of the pro-Russian political bloc, staged prolonged protests against the construction of a wastewater treatment facility, a project tied to EU accession requirements and critical infrastructure modernization. At points, protesters blocked key roads and access to the main airport, disrupting public order and causing political crisis.

The latest twist in the saga is that one of the main Serbian nationalist/pro-Russian parties in Montenegro, Democratic People’s Party, whose leader is also on trial for GRU-sponsored Coup D’état scheme, is now threatening to withdraw its support for the government unless Constitution of Montenegro is changed to fit radical Serbian nationalist assimilation goals. This proves that the protest has never been about the local issue of wastewater management – it has been about hybrid attempts to destabilize Montenegro from within and derail its European integration.

Even more worrying are emerging narratives and discussions in localities like Pljevlja, where nationalist figures have openly entertained Donbas-style “People’s Republics” or secessionist schemes as part of rhetorical posturing – without meaningful pushback from state security institutions. Such talk, particularly if it gains traction among disaffected communities or armed groups, poses a risk that goes beyond political rhetoric into real security challenge.

Another area of concern is Montenegro’s borders. Since 2020, there has been a reported hollowing out of professional capacity within the border police, with experienced officers replaced by politically aligned appointees. This weakens border integrity in multiple ways. One is the facilitation of irregular electoral influences, such as cross-border “election tourism”, a tactic seen elsewhere in the region where voters are bused from neighboring states to skew results. While precise documentation of such efforts in Montenegro is limited in open sources, analogous practices involving transporting voters from neighboring jurisdictions have been observed in Serbian elections and critiqued as undermining democratic process.⁹ Secondly, weak border control creates an environment that could enable paramilitary or hybrid actors to move more freely, heightening the risk of unauthorized incursions, arms trafficking, or orchestrated destabilization.

Taken together, these structural weaknesses and political realities illustrate that Montenegro’s security framework – both institutional and societal – is currently ill-prepared for concerted hybrid or conventional threats. If actors in Belgrade or Moscow decide to escalate pressures on Montenegro, they face a state whose defenses are legally constrained, politically fragmented, and institutionally compromised.

This precarious security backdrop also has a direct impact on Montenegro’s foreign policy and diplomatic posture. The persistent influence of Serbian political actors and the SOC, combined with the tangible internal security vulnerabilities, has encouraged a foreign policy stance marked by caution and restraint toward Serbia rather than one oriented firmly toward Montenegro’s national interest and strategic autonomy. Rather than projecting confidence in protecting its sovereignty and advancing integration with the EU and NATO, Montenegro’s diplomacy is often pulled toward negotiating with or accommodating Serbian preferences, weakening its negotiating position on key regional issues.

In the following section, we explore in more depth how these dynamics – political, cultural, and security-related – intertwine to shape Montenegro’s foreign policy and diplomatic orientation, illuminating the challenges the country faces in asserting its sovereign interests on the regional and international stage.

Foreign policy and Diplomacy

Montenegro’s foreign policy and diplomatic posture is perhaps the clearest example of the gap between surface appearances and underlying reality. On paper, Montenegro presents itself as a reliable NATO ally and a Western-oriented state, steadily advancing a the European Union integration path, implementing EU-imposed sanctions on Russia, and supporting Ukraine through multiple channels, including military assistance and the “PURL” mechanism, which President Zelensky publicly acknowledged Montenegro as having joined. These actions project a façade of alignment with Western norms, strategic coherence, and regional responsibility.

Yet beneath this polished exterior, structural weaknesses and external influences compromise Montenegro’s foreign policy effectiveness. Fear of Serbia and the entrenched influence of pro-Serbian parties and the Serbian Orthodox Church create persistent distortions in regional diplomacy, constraining Montenegro’s ability to act decisively in its national interest.

Relations with Croatia, a crucial actor for Montenegro’s EU accession, illustrate this dynamic. For example, Montenegro’s parliamentary vote on the Resolution on Genocide in Jasenovac – a sensitive historical issue – was influenced by pro-Serbian factions and generated tension between the two countries.¹⁰ Similarly, disputes over the historic naval training ship “Jadran”, where nationalist rhetoric has overshadowed pragmatic negotiation, have been leveraged domestically by Serbian-oriented politicians to signal loyalty to Belgrade at the expense of constructive bilateral engagement. These actions undermine Montenegro’s credibility and strategic leverage with key EU partners whose support is necessary for accession.

The pattern repeats in relations with Kosovo. Although Montenegro officially recognizes Kosovo, its stance on Kosovo’s Council of Europe membership has remained ambiguous, with pro-Serbian forces in Montenegro frequently pushing for non-committal or obstructive positions.¹¹ These vacillations reduce Montenegro’s standing as a consistent, predictable actor in regional diplomacy and diminish its capacity to advance both bilateral and multilateral objectives.

What is particularly concerning is the selective responsiveness that defines Montenegro’s external posture: the government exhibits rapid, often symbolic reactions to perceived slights or provocations by neighboring countries, yet displays relative inaction in the face of sustained hybrid interference from Serbia and Russia, including the systematic negation of Montenegrin identity and culture. This asymmetry not only weakens Montenegro’s strategic credibility but also signals a governance culture driven more by fear and ideology than by long-term national interest.

The Montenegrin diplomatic service itself is a contributing factor. While numerous competent, professional, and patriotic diplomats continue to serve, systemic vulnerabilities remain. Pro-Russian and anti-Western cadres, motivated either by Yugonostalgia or Serbian nationalism, still occupy influential positions. In some instances, these officials have shaped policies contrary to Montenegro’s strategic priorities, privileging ideological adherence over practical statecraft. Beyond ideological bias, the diplomatic service exhibits a corporate culture that favors procedural formality over decisive action, slow bureaucratic processes over responsive diplomacy, and risk avoidance over assertive advocacy, all of which diminish the country’s ability to respond effectively to regional crises or advance its EU accession goals.

Taken together, these factors reveal a foreign policy apparatus constrained by fear, historical grievances, ideological adherence, and internal compromise, rather than fully empowered to defend and promote Montenegro’s interests. While on the surface Montenegro appears aligned with NATO and EU priorities, the underlying structural and political constraints leave the country vulnerable to external pressure and internal manipulation.

In the next section, we will turn to Montenegro’s economic situation, examining structural vulnerabilities such as partitocracy, extensive public sector employment, and challenges to fiscal sustainability, which – like political, cultural, and security pressures – pose a significant threat to long-term stability and development.

Economic Situation

As noted in the introduction, Montenegro’s economy has shown resilience in certain areas. GDP growth in recent years, though modest, has highlighted the country’s potential, particularly in sectors like tourism, infrastructure development, and Western investment. The Montenegrin government has demonstrated a proactive approach to attract foreign capital, focusing on key projects such as transportation infrastructure, renewable energy, and tourism expansion. There has also been notable effort to revitalize tourism as a cornerstone of the economy, especially along the coast, which remains one of the most attractive tourist destinations in the Adriatic. These efforts are commendable and demonstrate the country’s awareness of the need for economic diversification.

However, despite these positive efforts, the economic sustainability of Montenegro is under significant threat. Several structural issues risk undermining the country’s longer-term economic stability. The public sector, which has grown disproportionately, is a central concern. According to some estimates, between a quarter and a third of Montenegro’s total workforce is employed in the public sector, which places an immense strain on public finances and limits the country’s fiscal flexibility.¹² This bloated bureaucracy, inherited from the long rule of the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS), remains a critical vulnerability.

The growth of the public sector is not just a fiscal problem; it has bred partitocracy, a system in which loyal party members are rewarded with cushy, often unnecessary public sector jobs. This practice of using public employment as a political tool originated under the DPS government, where the clientelist system was institutionalized, giving political parties disproportionate influence over the public sector. In theory, the current government came to power promising to dismantle this patronage system and reform public administration. However, in practice, the partitocracy is not only still alive, it is worse than ever. Each new political faction, instead of implementing real reforms, has perpetuated the very system it criticized. This contributes to unnecessary government spending and deepens public sector inefficiency. It also hampers private sector growth, as talented individuals are often overlooked in favor of politically connected candidates.

Moreover, while the “Europe Now” programs, Europe Now 1 and Europe Now 2,  introduced substantial salary increases for public sector employees, the short-term benefits of these wage hikes have been eroded by inflation. These programs, which aimed to raise the average salary and improve living standards, have indirectly fueled inflation, particularly in the consumer goods and housing markets. The result is that much of the gains from salary increases have been wiped out, leaving real wages largely stagnant.

The government, in response, has attempted to combat inflation with price controls and occasionally encourages citizens to boycott supermarkets in an attempt to curb rising costs. However, these measures, while well-intentioned, are largely ineffective and counterproductive. They create unnecessary tensions between the public sector and private enterprises, disrupt the market economy, and deter investment. The private sector feels stifled by government interference, and the investment climate has become less attractive as a result. The correct response to inflation should involve reducing public spending, particularly on unsustainable government employment, and focusing on stimulating productivity and private sector investment, rather than trying to control prices in the market.

All of these economic challenges point to the reality that Montenegro’s economic stability is under threat, much as its political and security stability is. The underlying structural issues – a bloated public sector, ineffective governance, and a poor investment climate – continue to hold the country back from fully realizing its potential. In the next section, we will explore the role of the parliamentary opposition in Montenegro. Unfortunately, like the current government, the opposition is also part of the problem, rather than the solution. We will analyze how their weaknesses contribute to the country’s political and economic malaise, and how they too hinder Montenegro’s path forward.

Weaknesses of the Parliamentary Opposition of Montenegro

The Montenegrin parliamentary opposition is largely composed of the political parties that ruled the country from the late 1990s until 2020, with the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS), led by Milo Djukanović, at the forefront. The DPS and its affiliated parties have undeniably played a pivotal role in Montenegro’s modern history, particularly in the peaceful restoration of the country’s independence, the pro-Western foreign policy course, and the successful NATO accession process. These are important historical achievements, and Djukanović and the DPS rightly deserve credit for navigating Montenegro through some of its most critical moments, including the opening and closing of the EU accession chapters. These are tangible milestones that will forever be part of the Montenegrin legacy.

However, despite these achievements, the current opposition parties carry significant baggage from their time in power. During their rule, they established a patronage-based clientelistic system, which saw the state apparatus being used to reward political loyalty with public sector jobs, government contracts, and other forms of patronage. These practices created deep structural inefficiencies, while also making the parties vulnerable to corruption scandals. There were also alleged ties to organized crime that further tainted their reputation. Such scandals and allegations over the years have left the opposition highly compromised in the eyes of Montenegro’s electorate. As a result, they have become easy targets for politically-motivated investigations by the current government, which, regardless of whether the allegations are true or not, finds it easier to gain public acceptance for these investigations, given the public perception of corruption.

This public perception of guilt has had a paralyzing effect on the opposition. Fear of becoming embroiled in Special Prosecutor investigations means that the opposition is extremely cautious in its activities. They tend to play it safe, avoiding confrontation or the risk of being publicly labeled as corrupt or aligned with illicit activities. This fear of legal retribution has, in turn, encouraged an ultra-soft, compromise-driven stance, even when it comes to issues of Montenegro’s sovereignty, statehood, and national identity.

The opposition, under the guise of supporting EU integration and avoiding roadblocks in Montenegro’s path to the EU, has thus failed to react appropriately to some of the most egregious actions of the current government. They have shown inaction and a lack of backbone in responding to attacks on Montenegrin identity and statehood, as well as to serious breaches of the rule of law — such as the illegal dismissal of a Constitutional Court justice. By softening their stance and failing to engage with these issues decisively, the opposition has allowed anti-Montenegrin elements, including those tied to the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) and Serbian nationalist parties, to continue pushing forward their agenda without significant resistance.

Additionally, part of the problem lies with the younger factions within the opposition. These individuals, many of whom are now enjoying parliamentary privileges without the pressure of real executive decision-making, are often more inclined toward conformism than active governance. The life in opposition, free from the hard decisions and difficult compromises that come with actually holding power, has led to a lack of urgency and political engagement from a significant portion of the opposition’s rank and file. Their comfort zone within the confines of opposition has made them less effective in challenging the government and more willing to tolerate the status quo, even when it undermines the country’s long-term interests.

Another concerning trend is the opposition’s growing difficulty in clearly defining its global orientation and its increasingly weak commitment to Western values. At the same time, pro-Serbian elements within the governing majority have begun to appropriate the opposition’s once dominant pro-Western rhetoric (though not its policies). Moreover, the opposition’s increasingly pronounced leftist rhetoric has positioned it less as a defender of Montenegrin sovereignty and more as a participant in a broader global ideological battle between left-wing populism and right-wing populist movements that have gained momentum in many parts of Europe. By trying to cast themselves as part of the “global struggle of the left”, the opposition has alienated a significant portion of pro-Montenegrin conservative voter base.

Many in Montenegro, especially those with strong national or religious identities, feel that this “woke” or culturally Marxist approach is a distraction from the country’s true national priorities. The politics of World War II divisions, used to define the conflict between fascism and communism, are simply out of touch with the current political landscape of Montenegro in 2025. This failure to connect with the broader electorate on core national issues significantly weakens the opposition’s position, limiting their appeal and leaving them without the necessary base to challenge the current government effectively.

Ultimately, these weaknesses – fear of investigation, ideological fragmentation, failure to stand up for Montenegro’s interests, and inability to engage with a large segment of the population – leave the parliamentary opposition in a deeply compromised state. As a result, they are ill-equipped to perform their essential role of government oversight, putting government actions under scrutiny, and defending the national interest against pro-Serbian and pro-Russian influences. This is a critical problem because, without a robust and effective opposition, the government’s anti-Montenegrin tendencies (whether ideological or influenced by external actors) are likely to remain unchecked. As has been the case with the current government and Serbian Orthodox Church, unchecked authority is a recipe for authoritarianism.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The situation in Montenegro is precarious, with the country’s democratic and sovereign future hanging in the balance. Serbia’s influence, the growing anti-Western currents within the political establishment, and the disempowered opposition are all contributing to the erosion of Montenegro’s political, economic, and security stability. If immediate corrective actions are not taken, Montenegro risks sliding into a state of political decay, economic instability, and eventual authoritarianism. Swift and determined action is required, both from within Montenegro and from the international community, to ensure the country’s future remains firmly anchored in the West and that its path to EU membership is maintained.

Below are the key recommendations for Montenegro’s patriotic political forces and the West (EU, US, and NATO).

Recommendations for Montenegro

1. Development of New Political Forces:
   
   • It is essential to develop new political movements that present a patriotic, pro-Montenegrin ideology rooted in national interests and economic prudence. These new forces should aim to break the monopoly of pro-Serbian and pro-Russian parties by engaging the disillusioned electorate, particularly the 40-50% of voters who do not participate in elections. Specialized opinion polls should be conducted to understand the motivations and preferences of these non-voters, and targeted campaigns should be developed to attract them to the ballot box. This would give rise to a political alternative that genuinely represents Montenegrin sovereignty and the interests of its people. These political forces should advocate for Montenegrin cultural and national identity, promote strict immigration policies (including reviewing citizenships granted to former war refugees), and take a hardline stance against anti-Montenegrin influences, especially within the security sector. Additionally, it should boost defense spending in line with NATO standards, targeting 5% of GDP to improve Montenegro’s military and security apparatus, ensuring that pro-Serbian and pro-Russian elements are purged from these critical institutions. Economic reforms should also focus on fiscal prudence, slashing public spending, reducing the bloated public sector, and ending partitocracy.
2. Promote Montenegrin National Identity and Culture:
   • A cultural renaissance must be initiated in order to promote and safeguard Montenegro’s national identity. Establishing cultural organizations and institutions dedicated to Montenegrin history, culture, and heritage is critical. Additionally, intellectuals, artists, and cultural activists should be mobilized into a movement that actively advocates for Montenegro’s cultural autonomy within the country and on the international stage. This cultural movement will counterbalance the influence of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) and other foreign influences attempting to negate Montenegro’s distinct identity.
3. Rethink Ideology:
   • Montenegro must discard the divisive ideologies of the past – namely, fascism and communism – and reaffirm its commitment to the Western model of governance. Montenegro needs a firm belief in the superiority of democratic values, such as free-market capitalism, individual rights, human freedoms, and democracy. These values must be central to Montenegro’s identity, as they are the foundation of its Western orientation. This ideological shift is essential to counter both Serbian nationalism and the cultural Marxism that currently holds sway in parts of the political opposition.
4. Reduce the Influence of the Serbian Orthodox Church:
   • The Serbian Orthodox Church has long been a tool of Serbian and Russian hybrid warfare against Montenegro, and its political influence must be curtailed. The Montenegrin Orthodox Church has proven to be a compromised and ineffective alternative, and therefore efforts should focus on fostering cultural and religious cooperation with other Orthodox and Christian organizations that promote a non-political Christianity. The SOC’s influence should be challenged, and its ties to Russian and Serbian intelligence should be exposed for what they are: a threat to the sovereignty and independence of Montenegro.

Recommendations for the West (EU, US, and NATO)

1. Support Civil Society and Independent Media in Montenegro:
   • The EU should place renewed emphasis on strengthening Montenegro’s civil sector and independent media, both of which are crucial to democratic accountability. While Montenegro’s civil society has been weakened in recent years, it still holds the potential to act as a powerful counterbalance to the growing authoritarian tendencies in the country. The EU should work to reinvigorate the civil sector, ensuring that it plays an active role in promoting transparency, human rights, rule of law, and the fight against corruption – irrespective of whether abuses come from the ruling coalition or the opposition.
2. Strict Conditionality for Chapters 23 and 24:
   • The EU must adopt a strict approach to the rule of law and the fight against corruption and organized crime, particularly through Chapters 23 and 24 of the EU Acquis. Reform and de-weaponization of the judicial system in Montenegro should be a non-negotiable condition for progress in EU accession.
3. Purge Pro-Serbian and Pro-Russian Elements from Montenegro’s Security Sector:
   • NATO must continue to press Montenegro to cleanse its security sector of pro-Serbian and pro-Russian elements that could threaten the security of NATO. The process of removing these elements was successfully carried out during Montenegro’s NATO accession process, but after 2020, the Russo-Serbian penetration into the Montenegrin security sector has been successfully achieved again. Therefore, the „cleansing process“ must be repeated to ensure that Montenegro’s security is aligned with NATO’s values and interests. NATO and the US should use their influence to ensure the security sector is fully loyal to Montenegro, not to foreign actors.
4. Repudiate the Malign Influence of the Serbian Orthodox Church:
   • Both the EU and the US should publicly repudiate the influence of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) in Montenegro. The SOC is no longer just a religious institution; it is a front organization for Russian hybrid warfare in the region. Its activities should be exposed, and Montenegro should be encouraged to develop alternative Orthodox Christian ties that promote peaceful coexistence, rather than political manipulation by foreign powers.
5. Pressurize Serbia to Keep Its Hands Off Montenegro:
   • The US, EU, and UK must use diplomatic and economic pressure on Belgrade to prevent further interference in Montenegro’s internal affairs. US especially can play a pivotal role here, since successfull pressure against Serbia can be achieved with a combination of diplomatic and economic means, without spending money and/or putting American „boots on the ground“. Regulation of affairs in Montenegro and consequently the Balkans can therefore be an easy win for President Trump, while fully in line with „America First“ and „Peace Through Strength“ principles. This is especially relevant for Montenegro, given its strategic position on the Adriatic, including control over the largest warm water port in the area.
     Overall, Serbian influence is a major destabilizing factor and poses a direct threat to Montenegro’s EU integration and NATO alliance. Belgrade’s role in Montenegro’s future cannot be allowed to grow unchecked. The West should use diplomacy, sanctions, and economic measures to curb Serbian efforts to destabilize Montenegro and undermine its sovereignty.

Conclusion

The swift execution of these recommendations can drastically improve Montenegro’s prospects for a stable, prosperous future, ensuring its place in the EU and solidifying its role as a secure NATO ally. By mobilizing new political forces, revitalizing Montenegro’s national identity, and reducing external influences, Montenegro can chart a course toward a more democratic, sovereign, and prosperous future.

However, failure to act, both from Montenegro’s political leadership and from the West, will lead to devastating consequences. Montenegro risks becoming an authoritarian, anti-Western statelet, destabilized by internal division, Russian influence, and pro-Serbian nationalism. This could lead to civil unrest and even the collapse of the EU accession process, with Montenegro’s NATO membership rendered meaningless. The stakes are high, and the time to act is now.