Introduction
Since the consequential parliamentary election in August 2020, the political situation in Montenegro has been characterized by increasing influence and control by Serbia (and, given their aligned interests in Montenegro, Russia). Pro-Serbian, pro-Russian, and anti-Western forces now hold a parliamentary majority, occupy key positions in government, and exercise near-total control over Montenegro’s security sector. This institutional dominance has also enabled strong electoral performances—for instance, in the recent local elections in Nikšić, the pro-Serbian, pro-Russian party For the Future of Montenegro secured 35% of the vote and is poised to appoint the next mayor1.
It is evident that Serbia—and by extension, Russia—has no interest in Montenegro joining the European Union. President Putin opposes further EU enlargement in general. For President Vučić’s Serbia, Montenegrin accession would signify a loss of influence over the country and represent a foreign policy failure: Montenegro would gain EU membership while Serbia remains outside. Consequently, Serbia has used, and continues to use, its de facto control over Montenegrin institutions and its local proxies (pro-Serbian politicians across party lines) to derail Montenegro’s European integration process.
Sabotaging the Democracy and EU Integration Process
Numerous instances demonstrate how Serbian proxies in Montenegro are obstructing integration. In June 2024, shortly after Montenegro received a favorable Interim Benchmark Assessment Report, the Montenegrin Parliament—dominated by pro-Serbian parties—adopted a controversial Resolution on the Genocide in the Jasenovac Concentration Camp, provoking a diplomatic dispute with Croatia. This dispute led to Croatia blocking the provisional closure of Chapter 31 of the EU Acquis (Common Foreign and Security Policy) in December 20242.
Despite this, three other chapters of the Acquis were provisionally closed that same month—a clear message from EU member states, including Croatia, that Montenegro’s full membership remained a priority. However, immediately following this progress, the Constitutional Committee of the Montenegrin Parliament triggered a constitutional crisis by unlawfully forcing Constitutional Court Justice Dragana Đuranović into retirement. This action reduced the number of Constitutional Court justices to five (out of a required seven), thereby paralyzing the institution’s decision-making process.
Given that the Constitutional Court is the final authority on election disputes and the constitutionality of controversial legislation (such as the proposed Law on Citizenship or the Law on Foreign Agents), it is evident what the parliamentary majority aims to achieve: to render elections uncompetitive and pass laws that undermine Montenegro’s sovereignty and democracy while bypassing constitutional safeguards. In short, the goal is to transform Montenegro into a new Georgia or Venezuela—an authoritarian state under heavy Serbian and Russian influence, effectively a “Republika Srpska by the Sea.”
After the constitutional crisis erupted in December 2024, Montenegro’s pro-Western parliamentary opposition resisted the illegal retirement attempt through filibustering and by physically blocking parliamentary procedures. These protests, which at times included preventing or disrupting parliamentary sessions, continued until the end of January 2025. The Speaker of Parliament subsequently barred opposition MPs from participating in discussions on the 2025 Budget Law, prompting the opposition to withdraw from the session rather than disrupt it further. This allowed the Budget and several other economic bills to pass, effectively breaking the blockade.
This brings us to the current situation: both government and opposition have invited experts from the Venice Commission to mediate the constitutional dispute, and the opposition has returned to Parliament3. However, their request for a moratorium on controversial proposals—such as the Law on Citizenship and the Law on Foreign Agents—alongside a renewed focus on European integration, has yet to receive a decisive response.
The Weakness of the Opposition
It has thus become clear that the current opposition lacks either the capacity or political will to effectively resist the creeping authoritarianism in Montenegro. There are three primary reasons for this.
First, pro-Serbian and pro-Russian forces are increasingly weaponizing Montenegro’s judiciary and prosecutorial institutions. While corruption and organized crime are indeed systemic problems across the political spectrum, law enforcement agencies disproportionately target opposition figures, while turning a blind eye to alleged crimes committed by government officials and members of the pro-Serbian/pro-Russian parliamentary majority. This selective enforcement creates an atmosphere of fear, leading the opposition to moderate their activities to avoid legal persecution.
Second, despite their pro-European rhetoric, opposition parties remain vulnerable to malign Russian influence. Their fierce opposition to the construction of an LNG terminal in Bar—funded by U.S. and EU investments—and their local alignment with pro-Serbian and pro-Russian actors to block the project are telling4. Moreover, it is widely known in Montenegro that certain opposition figures, when in power, operated under direct Russian influence and used their positions to steer the country’s foreign policy—particularly in multilateral forums—away from Western alignment and closer to Russian and Chinese positions.
Third and finally, while the opposition may ideologically support European integration and Western values, they often fail to embody these principles in practice. They are entrenched participants in Montenegro’s partitocratic, competitive authoritarian political system. Together with the ruling parties—regardless of ideological alignment—they have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. Consequently, while their opposition to anti-democratic practices such as the “constitutional coup,” the manipulation of citizenship laws to sway elections, and the adoption of the Law on Foreign Agents is vocal, it remains fundamentally limited. In practice, their resistance is insufficient.
Unfavorable Regional Situation
The regional context is also unfavorable for pro-Western forces in Montenegro. Although Vučić’s regime in Serbia is currently grappling with widespread anti-corruption student protests, the likelihood of these protests toppling the deeply rooted authoritarian system—one that has persisted for more than 150 years with brief interruptions—is minimal. Despite some decline in popularity, a significant portion of the Serbian electorate continues to support Vučić. Should snap elections occur, it is likely that Vučić and his affiliated parties would still form the government5.
Western powers have shown little interest in supporting these protests, which are further complicated by occasional anti-Western and pro-Russian rhetoric. Moreover, any instability in the Western Balkans is presently unacceptable to the EU and the U.S., both of whom are preoccupied with more pressing crises (Ukraine, the Middle East, and strained transatlantic relations). Thus, as long as Vučić refrains from overt conflict and keeps his “escalation agents” (such as Dodik and Radoičić) under control, the West will—at least tacitly—support his continued rule.
Importantly, Vučić and the system he represents have no genuine interest in Serbia joining the EU, despite official rhetoric to the contrary. What Vučić seeks is a “perpetual integration loop”—a process in which Serbia never formally joins the EU but never officially withdraws from accession negotiations either. This strategy enables Serbia to access EU funds and maintain privileges (e.g., visa-free travel to the Schengen Area) without implementing the reforms that would threaten the authoritarian system, dismantle corruption networks, or curtail nationalist agendas aimed at regional destabilization.
One must not forget: for Serbia, destabilization is the objective, nationalism merely the instrument6. A destabilized Western Balkans provides fertile ground for the myth that Serbia—its people and culture—are under existential threat, a narrative used to justify authoritarianism and reinforce the dominance of Serbia’s military-intelligence apparatus and the Serbian Orthodox Church in political and societal life.
The West is Asleep at the Wheel
So far, the EU (and the U.S.) has failed to recognize the severity of this threat. Instead, they pursue two flawed strategies. One is appeasement—hoping that Vučić will refrain from initiating conflict. While large-scale war has not broken out (though the risk remains), accommodating an authoritarian regime that serves as a conduit for Russian, Chinese, and Iranian influence undermines Western credibility and perpetuates low-intensity instability, endemic corruption, and democratic erosion.
The second mistake is the EU’s insistence that enlargement is a strictly technical process, when in fact it is inherently political. By focusing on procedural benchmarks, the EU enables fundamentally anti-Western actors in Serbia, North Macedonia, and Montenegro to claim “progress” by opening and closing chapters, while simultaneously enacting policies—such as Montenegro’s constitutional crisis—that blatantly contravene democratic norms and the rule of law. Mixed messaging, as evidenced by the recent comments from German Chancellor-in-waiting Merz7, only exacerbates the situation.
By ignoring the mounting problems in Montenegro—political instability, anti-Western foreign policy alignment, and democratic backsliding—the EU risks allowing the country to follow the path of Georgia or Venezuela. Considering the electoral strength and deep institutional control currently exercised by anti-democratic forces, this risk grows exponentially by the day.
Recommendations
- Pro-Western forces in Montenegro should diversify the political landscape by establishing new parties and movements capable of breaking through the “cordon sanitaire” imposed by pro-Serbian factions that have kept them out of power.
- These forces must also move beyond their reliance on the “old guard” for strategy and campaigning—an approach that has repeatedly proven ineffective.
- Pro-Western actors in Montenegro should abandon the notion of influencing political change in Serbia. The current fixation on student protests there is misguided; even in the unlikely event of regime change, Serbia’s imperialist and revisionist posture towards Montenegro is likely to persist. Political developments in Serbia should therefore be monitored solely as potential security threats. Montenegro will only achieve full independence from Serbia’s destabilizing influence when it begins to treat Belgrade with indifference—not with hope, love, or resentment.
- The West—especially the European Union—must adopt a firmer stance towards Vučić’s regime in Serbia. The first step is recognizing that Serbia’s current political system, regardless of Vučić’s personal role, is a core part of the problem in the Balkans, not the solution.
- Accordingly, EU policy towards Serbia should shift from engagement and appeasement to containment and isolation. A timely opportunity to make this pivot is the upcoming Victory Day Parade in Moscow (May 9), where Vučić’s confirmed attendance has already raised concerns in European capitals. The EU must stop enabling Serbia’s “perpetual integration loop”—remaining in accession talks with no intention of completing them—by making continued negotiations conditional on Serbia ceasing its regional destabilization, undertaking real democratic reforms, and moving swiftly and decisively towards recognizing Kosovo’s independence.
- Within Montenegro, the EU should make further accession progress contingent upon strict adherence to the rule of law, and explicitly voice concern over the involvement of pro-Russian, authoritarian elements in the government. Furthermore, in partnership with the US, UK, and NATO, the EU should encourage Montenegro to end its current dependence on Vučić’s Serbia and actively counter Serbian malign influence by joining the emerging Croatia–Albania–Kosovo–Bulgaria defense cooperation alliance.
